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Abstract
This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of
when the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific expla-
nations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish
clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory.
Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all
causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the
simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies
of the input parameters. If a simulation is not explanatory, it can still
be meaningful for exploratory purposes, but only under very restricted
conditions.
In the second step, I examine a few examples of Axelrod-style
simulations as they have been used to understand the evolution of co-
operation (Axelrod, Schu¨ßler) and the evolution of the social contract
(Skyrms). These simulations do not meet the criteria for explanatory
validity and it can be shown, as I believe, that they lead us astray
from the scientific problems they have been addressed to solve and at
the same time bar our imagination against more conventional but still
better approaches.
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11 Introduction
Computer simulations have become a popular tool in various branches of sci-
ence, including even the social sciences. The reasons are easy to understand:
Computer simulations provide a simple and yet powerful tool to explore the
implications of theoretical assumptions. They are cheaper than experiments
and often easier to construct and to handle than mathematical models. At
the same time they confine the realm of what can be modeled only to what
can be described algorithmically, which gives them a very broad scope. With
this tool at hand it should be possible to bring into the reach of exact treat-
ment even such questions that have traditionally seemed to defy the use of
formal methods.
However, upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that computer sim-
ulations do not always deliver what they promise. Often they remain in the
state of purely theoretical “toy simulations” and never get to the ground of
empirical testability. In the following, I will first try to put forward a few
straight forward criteria for proper explanatory computer simulations. After
that I will analyse some examples of computer simulations that fail to meet
these criteria as well as the bad consequences this failure has.
2 Different aims of computer simulations in
science
Computer simulations can be employed in science not only for generating
eplanations but for various different purposes. They can, for example, be used
to merely express certain theoretical assumptions or concepts. In this sense
they provide a sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger but usually simpler
and more flexible alternative to mathematical modelling. Or they can be used
to prove the “logical possibility” of certain general assumptions such as the
assumption that cooperation is possible among egoists. Or they can be used
to explore the possible consequences or implications of certain assupmtions.
All of these previously mentioned uses of computer simulations will in the
following be subsumed under the general title of exploratory simulations. It is
2the distinctitive mark of this type of simulations that these simulations do not
need to resemble any empirical reality. If there exists any resemblence at all
then it is typically vague and consists in the plausibility of the assumptions.
Another – potentially more important – class of computer simulations are
predictive simulations. The purpose of predictive simulations is to generate
predictions of some empirical process. An example might be simulations in
meteorology that predict how the wheather is going to be in the future. The
assumptions that enter into predictive simulations do not need to be in any
way realistic. As long as the predictions prove to be reliable, it is permissible
to use strongly simplified assupmtions about the modeled process or even
assumptions which are known to be false. This shows that just because a
simulation produces successful predictions it does not necessarily also provide
an explanation for the predicted phenomena, even though successful predic-
tions may be one among several indicators for a simulation to be explantorily
valid.
The most desired case, however, would be that of an explanatory simula-
tion that is a type of computer simulation that actually allows us to explain
the empirical phenomena that are modeled in the simulation. It is this class
of simulations or, rather, the class of simulations that pretend to be explana-
tory but really are not that I will be concerned with in this paper.
3 Criteria for “explanatory” simulations
But in what sense can a computer simulations be explanatory? And what
are the criteria a computer simulation must meet in order to be explanatory?
A computer simulation can be called explanatory if it adaequately models
some empirical situation and if the result of the computer simulation (the
simulation results) coincides with the outcome of the modeled empirical pro-
cess (the empirical results). If this is the case, we can conclude that the
empirical results have been caused by the very factors (or, more precisely,
by the empirical correspondents of the factors) that have brought about the
simulation results in the computer simulation.
To take an example, let us say we have a game theoretic computer simu-
3lation of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where under certain specified con-
ditions the strategy “tit for tat” emerges as the clear winner. Now, assume
further that we know of an empirical situation that closely resembles the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma with exactly the same conditions as in our sim-
ulations. (The (probably) easiest way to bring this about would be by con-
ducting a game theoretic experiment, where the conditions can be closely
monitored.) And let us finally assume that also in the empirical situation
the “tit for tat” strategy emerges as the most successful strategy. Then we
are entitled to conclude that “tit for tat”was successful in the empirical case,
because the situation was a prisoner’s dilemma with such and such boundary
conditions and because – as the computer simulation shows – “tit for tat”
is a winning strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma situations under the
respective conditions.
Now that we have seen how explanations by computer simulations work in
principle, let us ask what are the criteria a computer simulation must fullfill
in order to deserve the title of an explanatory simulation. The criteria should
be such as to allow us to check whether the explanation is valid that is wheter
the coincidence of results is due to the congruence of the operating factors
(in the empirical sitaution and in the computer simulation) or whether it is
merely accidental.
As criteria that a computer simulation must meet in order to be an ex-
planatory model of an empirical process, I propose the following:
1. Adequacy Requirement: All causally relevant factors of the modeled
empirical process must be represented in the computer simulation.
2. Stability Requirement: The input parameters of the simulation must be
measurable with such accuracy that the simulation results are stable
within the range of inaccuracy of measurement.
If both criteria are met, we can say that there exists a close fit between
model and modeled reality. The claim I wish to hold is that only if there is a
close fit between model and reality we are entitled to say that the model ex-
plains anything. Even though the first two criteria are very straight forward,
4a little discussion will be helpful for a btter understanding. The motivation
for the third criterion, which might appear a little more obscure at first, will
be explained subsequently.
Regarding the first criterion, it should be obvious that if not all causally
relevant factors are included then any congruence of simulation results and
empirical resutls can at best be accidental. Two objections might be raised
at this point: 1) If there really is a congruence of simulation results and
empirical results should that not allow us to draw the conclusion that the
very factors implemented in the computer simulation are indeed all factors
that are causally relevant? 2) If we use computer simulations as a research
tool to find out what causes a certain empirical phenomenon, how are we to
know beforehand what the causally relevant factors are, and how are we ever
to find out, if drawing reverse conclusions from the compliance of the results
to the relevant causes is not allowed?
As to the first objection: If the simulation is used to generate empiri-
cal predictions and if the predictions come true then this can – with a few
hesitations – indeed be taken as a hint to its capturing all relevant causes
of the empirical process in question. The hesitations concern the problem
that even if a simulation has predictive success it can still have been based
on unrealistic assumptions. Sometimes the predictive success of a simulation
can even be increased by sacrificing realism. Therefore, in order to find out
whether the factors incorporated in the computer simulation are the causally
relevant factors we cannot rely on predictive success alone, but we have to
consult other sources as well, such as our scientific background knowledge
about the process in question.
As to the second objection: If we have a simulation that predicts cor-
rectly than we are – with the hesitations mentioned above – entitled to draw
reverse conclusions conclusions from the compliance of the results to the
exclusive causal relevance of the incorporated factors or mechanisms. How-
ever, this is impermissable if the simulation does not generate predictions,
but is just meant to give an ex-post explanation. For, if we only try long
enough, we are almost sure to find some computer simulation and some set
of input parameters that matches a previously fixed set of output data. The
5task of finding such a simulation amounts to nothing more than finding any
arbitrary algorithm that produces a given pattern. But then we will only
accidently have hit on the true causes that were responisible for the results
in the empirical process. The problem here is in some respects similar to the
problem of curve fitting, where one has to deal with the danger of overftting
a curve. One could try to apply similar tricks here as are often used with
curve fitting. For example, one could try to turn an ex-post explanation
into a quasi-prediction by dividing the data set (that describes the empiri-
cal results) and then designing and calibrating the simulation on only one
part of the divided data set. The thus calibrated simulation is then used
to “predict”, or rather “quasi-predict” the other part of the data set. If the
“quasi-predictions” prove to be true, we have some reason to assume that we
have hit upon the real causes. But, even if we use such methods to create
quasi-predictions, the above mentioned caveats apply.
Therefore, only if we make sure that all causally relevant factors are in-
cluded in the simulation, we can take it as an explanation. And usually we
cannot assure this by relying on the conformance of the simulations results
and the empirical results alone without any further considerations. Summa-
rizing we can say: If the first criterion is not fullfilled, then the computer
simulation does not explain.
The second criterion is even more straight forward. If the model is un-
stable, then we will not be able to check whether the simulation model is
adaequate. For, if it is not stable within the inevitable inaccuracies of mea-
surement, it does not deliver one result, but a range of different results. But
then we cannot say for sure, whether the empirical results are due to the
factors the model captures. Imagine for example, we had a games theoreti-
cal model that tells us whether some actors will cooperate or not cooperate.
Now assume, we had some empirical process at hand where we know that the
actors cooperate and we would like to know whether they do so for the very
reasons the model suggests. In other words: We would like to know whether
our model can explain why they cooperate. If the model is unstable then –
due to measurement inaccuracy – we do not know whether the empirical pro-
cess falls within in the range of input paramters for which the model predicts
6cooperation or not. But then there is no way to tell whether the actors in
the empirical process cooperated, because of the reasons the model suggests
or, quite the contrary, inspite of what the model would predict.
A special case of this problem of model stability and measurement inac-
curacies occurs when we can only determine the ordinal relations of greater
and smaller of some empirical quantity, but not it’s cardinal value (perhaps,
because it does not have a cardinal value by it’s very nature such as the
quantity of utility in economics for example), even though the simulation
crucially depends on the ordinal value of the respective input parameter.1
Briefly put, the morale of the second criterion is: If condition two is not met,
we cannot know whether the computer simulation explains.
In connection with the first criteria the requirement of model stability
(in relation to measurement inaccuracy) gives rise to a kind of dilemma.
An obvious way to make a model more adequate is by including further
parameters. Unfortunately, the more parameters are included in the model
the harder it becomes to handle. Often, though not necessarily, a model
looses stability by including additional parameters. Therefore, in order to
assure that the model is adequat (first criterion), we may have to lower the
degree of abstraction by including more and more parameters. But then
the danger increases that our model will not be sufficiently stable any more
(second criterion).
There exists no general strategy to avoid this dilemma. In many cases
it may not be possible at all to get around the dilemma. But this should
not come as a surprise. It merely reflects the fact that the use computer
simulations is, of course, limited. With the tool of computer simulations
many scientific problems get into the reach of formal modelling that would be
hard to handle with pure mathematics alone. Still, many scientific problems
remain outside the realm of what can be handled with formal methods, either
because of their complexity or because of the nature of the problem. This
remains especially true for many areas of the social sciences.
Apart from the two criteria listed above it is important that the output
1This is a well known restriction for modelling in economics, but it seems to have fallen
into oblivion when computer simulations hit the scene.
7of the computer simulation should reflect the empirical results with all the
details that are regarded as scientifically important, and not just – as it is
sometimes happens – merely a much sparser substructure of them. 2 For
example, we may want to use game theoretical models like the prisoner’s
dilemma to study the strategic interaction of states in politics. The game
theoretical model will tell us whether the states will cooperate or not, but
most probably it will say nothing about the concrete form of cooperation
(diplomatic contacts, trade agreements, international contracts etc.) or non
cooperation (embargos, military action, war etc.). Therefore, even if the
model or simulation really was predictively acurate, it does at best provide
us with a partial explanation, because it does not explain all aspects of the
empirical outcome that interest us. In the worst case it’s explanatory – or, as
the case may be, it’s predictive – power is almost as poor as that of a horo-
scope. The prediction of a horoscope that, for example, tomorrow“something
important” will happen easily becomes true, because of its vagueness. Simi-
larily, if a game theoretical simulation predicts that the parties of a political
conflict will stop cooperating at some stage, but does not tell us whether
this implies, say, war or just the breakup of diplomatic relations then it only
offers us comparatively unimportant information. We could also say that if
the simulation results fail to capture all important features of the empirical
outcome then the computer simulation “misses the point”.
Summing it up: Only if a computer simulation closely fits the simulated
reality – that is if it adequately models the causal factors involved, if it is
stable and if it is descriptively rich enough to “hit the point” – it can claim
to be explanatory.
4 Simulations that fail to explain
In the following I will to discuss two examples of computer simulations that
were designed by its authors to explain certain empirical phenomena but
ultimately fail to do so. But it is not only the failure to explain that I am
2This requirment could also be regarded as a second adequacy criteria, but to keep
things simple it has been left out from the list of criteria above.
8interested in. What concerns me more is the consequences these failures
had. In the one case it lead scientists away from the relevant questions and
made them indulge into the study of computer simulations that remained
almost completely useless for scientific explanation. In the other case it had,
as it seems, the effect of limiting the imagination so that some of the most
important features of the respecitve subject matter got overlooked.
Admittedly, both examples are examples of bad simulations. Why bother
looking at bad simulations? Because, in these cases the failures are just the
more obvious and they help us understand what to avoid. Also, at least
the type of simulations described in the first example has been immensely
popular for a long time.
4.1 Axelrod style simulations of the “evolution of co-
operation”
4.1.1 Typical features of Axelrod style simulations
My first example is concerned with the sort of computer simulations of “the
evolution of cooperation” that have become very popular after the publica-
tion of Robert Axelrod’s book Axelrod (1984) with the same title. Robert
Axelrod’s book is a surprising phenomenon for two reasons: First of all, be-
cause of the extraordinary success it had as far as its impact on the scientific
community is concerned. It spawned virtually miriads of subsequent studies
on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (the model Axelrod used) and the“evolu-
tion of cooperation”that went more or less along the same lines and employed
similar methods as Axelrod. An annotated biography from 1994 (ten years
after the first publication of “The Evolution of Cooperation”) lists more than
200 articles that directly relate to Axelrod’s study. But Axelrod’s approach
is also surprising for a second reason: The almost complete uselessness his
and his follower’s computer simulations of the reiterated prisoner’s dilemma
proved to have for the empirical research in the field.
How did Axelrod arrive at his results about cooperation and why did it
prove so difficult to support them empirically? In order to find out, if and
how cooperation can emerge among egoistic agents, Axelrod started off with
9a game theoretical model of a certrain type of cooperation dilemma, the well
known prisoner’s dilemma. Since the one shot prinsoner’s dilemma does not
offer many strategic opportunities (no rational player will ever cooperate in
the one shot prisoner’s dilemma, and any player who does fares worse than
if he or she did not), Axelrod built his simulation on top of the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. He conducted his famous computer tournaments of the
repeated two player prisoner’s dilemma with strategies that he had got from
many different participants. On top of the computer tournament he built an
“evolutionary simulation” simulating a population dynamical process among
these strategies by using the payoffs they gained in the tournament to calcu-
late their fitness values.3 Already at this point we may notice that the setup
of Axelrod’s simulation does not resemble any empirical situation whatso-
ever. The prisoner’s dilemma itself provides a concise abstract description
of the essential features of many dilemma situations that occur in reality,
but nowhere in this world we find an arrangement that really corresponds to
Axelrod’s computer tournament that is built on top of it. How are we then
to draw conclusions from the computer tournament with respect to empirical
cooperation dilemmas?
The way Axelrod proceeded was to examine the simulations results and to
draw generalizing conclusions from them. This is how Axelrod arrived at such
conclusions as that the strategy Tit For Tat is generally a very good strategy
in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, that a strategy should be friendly in the
sense that it should not start to defect, that a strategy should punish defec-
tion but not be too unforgiving, that the evolution of cooperation depends
crucially on the continuation of interaction and the like. Unfortunately, sub-
sequent research showed that none of these conclusions was generally true.
It suffices to change the simulation setup but a little bit and it pays to be
a cheater, or to be unforgiving (as is the case when the simulation is run
with all two state automata as a base strategy set). And, of course, Tit
For Tat does not always win the race. The general finding that cooperative
3The details are not important here. There exist many descriptions the best of which
is probably still Axelrod’s own book Axelrod (1984). Simulations of the repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma similar to Axelrod’s computer tournament can easily be found on the web.
(Google for “CoopSim” and you will find one of them.)
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strategies can be successful in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma as such is just
a trivial consequence of the game theoretical folk theoreme (Binmore, 1998,
p.???). And all other generalizing conclusions Axelrod drew were simply not
warrented.
Nonetheless, Axelrod’s pioneering work triggered off a multitude of similar
computer simulations of the prisoner’s dilemma or other games. Most of their
author’s were too cautious to draw such sweeping conclusions as Axelrod did.
Still, regarding their design and the kind of reasoning they rely on, many of
these simulations follow the pattern that was set by Axelrod’s role model.
In order to classify this type of simulation, we may speak of Axelrod style
simulations.
Generally speaking, Axelrod style simulations are computer simulations
that share the following typical features:
1. They are constructed from a set of plausible assumptions or on top
of a common mathematical model. In many cases they are derived
from existing Axelrod style simulations by adding new parameters or
changeing other boundary conditions. The concrete shape of the model
remains largely arbitrary and at the descretion of the scientist who
builds it.
2. They are not related to any particular empirical situation. (And most
certainly there exists no close fit to empirical reality in the sense ex-
plained before.) Thus they remain a primarily theoretical endeavour.
3. If any conclusions are drawn from the simulation, they are usually
drawn by means of inductive generalizations from the simulation re-
sults. The simulation is thus used to establish very general points or
rules of thumbs about its subject matter.
4.1.2 How Axelrod style simulations
Let us look in more detail on a typical exponent of this tradition of simu-
lation based research to see how Axelrod-style simulations work in practice.
An in many respects good example for this tradition is provided by Rodolf
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Schu¨ßler’s “Kooperation unter Egoisten” (Schu¨ßler, 1990). Schu¨ßler called
into question Axelrod’s assumption that continued interaction is a necessary
precondition for the evolution of cooperation. Quite the contrary to Axel-
rod’s thesis, Schu¨ßler wanted to show that cooperation can even emerge on
“anonymous markets”. In order to do so he set up is own Axelrod-style sim-
ulation where agents are free to break up the cycles of interaction whenever
they want. This encourages a kind of hit and run tactic where agents do not
cooperate in the last round before stopping the interaction on their behalf
and take away the benefit of single sided non cooperation without being pun-
ished. With the help of his computer simulation Schu¨ßler could demonstrate
that even in this case cooperative strategies could – under certain specific
simulation conditions – outcompete the cheaters. The reason for this as-
tonishing phenomenon is quite easy to understand: When the interaction is
broken up, the previous parnters of interaction are forced to pick their new
partner from the pool of free players. As the cooperative players tend to
be bound in partnerships by other cooperative players, the pool is made up
mainly of cheaters. Therefore a cheater has only a small chance to find a new
partner that can be exploited.
As can be seen, Schu¨ßler started off with some arbitrary and at best plau-
sible assumptions about an “anonymous market” that are in no way related
to any specific empirical situation (points one and two in the above list of
features of Axelrod-style simulations). But Schu¨ßler also had a deeper mo-
tivation for his simulation experiments, which brings us to the third point:
the general conclusion that are derived from the simulation results. With his
simulation that showed that cooperation could even emerge on “anonymous
markets” Schu¨ßler wanted to provide arguments against sociological norma-
tivism. Sociological normativism is by Schu¨ßler understood as the thesis
that social order cannot be upheld without social cohesion and the appeal
to common norms. The classical proponents of sociological normativism are
– among others – Ferdinand To¨nnies with his distinction of “Gesellschaft”
and “Gemeinschaft” and Emile Durkheim, who greatly emphasized the im-
portance of social bonds. By some modern sociologists (including Schu¨ßler
himself) this question is linked with what they call Hobbe’s problem, the
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problem whether and to what degree social order and coordinated action is
possible without central authority. Schu¨ßler’s simulation is linked with the
problem of sociological normativism in so far as it proves the “logical possi-
bility” (Schu¨ßler) of norm conformant behaviour (if cooperation is taken as
normatively desired in this case) even under abscence of authority or other
previously fixed coordination mechanisms such as cohesion. But does the
prove of this “logical possibilites” really establish a strong point against so-
ciological normativism? This is not at all the case. The fact that something
is logically possible does not even remotely imply that it is possible in real-
ity. When sociological normativists speak for the importance of social bonds
they usually do not mean to assert that it is by logical necessity that the
social order requires some level cohesion to function properly. Rather they
draw on the social character of human nature. Therefore, in order to refute
them, one has to show why their conception of human nature is wrong or
that the empirical support for their claims is inconclusive and could be inter-
preted otherwise. Claims about mere logical possibilities as they appear in
the highly stylized and artificial setting of agent based simulations are noto-
riously weak arguments in sociological discussions. Not the least so because
it would probably be easy to draw up Axelrod-style computer simulations
where under different but equally plausible boundary conditions cooperation
is bound to break down when social ties are weakend.
To do Schu¨ßler justice it must be mentioned that he is fully aware of the
just mentioned explanatory limits of his computer simulations and that he
discusses them frankly and with great intellectual honesty. It is only that
doing so he makes the reader wonder why he did care to fill a whole book
with computer simulations that demonstrate so little. The same questions
could be asked for many of the simulations that have been carried through
on the topic of the “evolution of cooperation”. Most later authors were, like
Schu¨ssler, more carful in drawing sweeping conclusions from their computer
simulations than Axelrod. But if no conclusions can be drawn from them, the
question inevitably arises what these computer simulations are good for after
all. It is this question that has become crucial in the case of Axelrod style-
simulations. In order to answer it, let us see how Axelrod-style simulations
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fare when it is attempted to employ them in the context of an explanation
of some real world phenomenon.
4.1.3 The explanatory irrelevance of Axelrod-style simulations in
social sciences
The probably most dramatic example for Axelrod’s theory of the “evolution
of cooperation” is given in his chapter on the trench war on the western front
in the First World War. During the long phases when no great battle took
place, a rather surprising phenomenon occured on many parts of the front
in this war: Hostilities lost in intensity and the number of casualties was
reduced to a figure that is suprisingly small given the fact that the soldiers
virtually eyeballed their opponents on the other side. The phenomenon has
been extensively studied by the historians of the epoch, among others by the
sociologist Tony Ashworth Ashworth (1980), who found out that it was due to
a kind of “live and let live” system that emerged on many (roughly one third)
of the quieter parts of the front line: The soldiers hoped that if they weren’t
taking too hard on their enemies then the enemies would do the like to them.
Thus, contrary to standing military orders, a kind of cooperation between the
opposing front soldiers emerged on the basis of an unspoken“live and let live”
agreement. Axelrod draws heavily on the description of Tony Ashworth as a
source and he fully acknowledges Ashworth’s achievements. Axelrod treats
the “live and let live” system in trench war as an execellent confirmation
case for his theory. But would his theory really be able to explain the “live
and let live” system? In order to find this out, let us see, whether Axelrod’s
computer simulations can add anything to the explanation of the “live and
let live” system that goes beyond the explanation that is already given in
Ashworth’s historical narrative. To do so we first have to briefly reconstruct
the explanation that is given by Ashworth and then check whether there exist
aspects of the phenomenon that Axelrod can explain better.
Ashworth, in historical treatment, identifies the following causes for the
“live and let live” system:
1. The strategical deadlock. It was virtually impossible to move the front-
line for either side.
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2. The natural desire of most soldiers to survive the war.
3. The unpersonal, “bureaucratic structure of agression” (Ashworth, 1980,
p. 76ff.).
4. Empathy with the soldiers on the other side of the front.
5. Whether elite troops or non elite troops were fighting on either side.
“Live and let live” was much less frequent where elite troops were in-
volved. (According to Ashworth this was the most decisive factor of
all.)
6. The “esprit de corps” that can, however, become either conductive or,
in the case of elite troups, impedimental to the emergence of the “live
and let live” system.
7. The branch of service. Infantry soldiers had to face a much greater
danger and consequently had a greater interest in “live and let live”
than artillery soldiers.
8. The limited means of the military leadership to supress “live and let
live”. (Only later they found an effective way to do so by organizing
raids on the enemy trenches.)
9. Initial causes such as christmas truces, bad wheather periods when
fighting was impossible, coincidental temporary ceasefire due to similar
daily routines on both sides (mealtimes).
At first sight it would seem quite obvious that Axelrod’s computer model
hardly captures any of these causes. If at all then only the first cause, the
strategical deadlock situation the soldiers were caught in, could roughly be
interpreted as a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. But then, this is only one in
a long list of causes, which means that Axelrod’s model is far from fullfilling
the adequacy requirement. It would therefore mean to strongly distort the
historical situation if we were to maintain that the soldiers cooperated in the
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“live and let live” type fashion, because they were caught in a repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma situation and because – as computer simulations demonstrate
– “tit for tat” often is a good strategy in such situations.
However, if the model helps to give us a deeper or more precise under-
standing of one of the different factors that contributed to the “live and let
live”-system, Axelrod’s model would still have some explanatory value, even
if only as a partial explanation. Also, we could still try to link some of the
other causes to Axelrod’s model by assuming that they determine the pref-
erences of the soldiers and thereby the payoff parameters of the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma that – according to Axelrod’s interpretation – they play
with their enemies. Thus, it is not unplausible to assume that the status of
the troop (elite troop or non elite troop) had a bearance on how the soldiers
valuated the situation they were in. While a non elite soldier would prefer
to be a coward and live an elite soldier might prefer to fight and risk death.
Consequently, elite soldiers might not even face a prisoner’s dilemma. Quite
in harmony with Axelrod’s model this could help to explain why “live and
let live” appeared only in one third of all cases.
The way Axelrod proceeded when determining the payoff parameters was
to asses by plausible reasoning the ordinal relations between the different al-
ternatives for soldiers according to their assumed preferences. Unfortunately
this is not enough, because the outcome of Axelrod’s simulation is strongly
sensitive to the cardinal values of the payoff parameters. This violates the sta-
bility requirement. Therefore we cannot know whether the soldiers followed
the “live and let live” strategy, because of what Axelrod’s model suggests, or
whether the opposite is true.
More generally, the difficulty of applying Axelrod style simulations to
political or historical science results from the problem that the values of
the required input parameters cannot be found ready made in the historical
records. They must be reconstructed through a complicated and error-prone
interpretation process. It is therefore hard to see, how the stability require-
ment can be fullfilled at all for simulations that are not extremely robust
right from the beginning. As we shall see later, a similar problem applies for
the application of Axelrod-style simulations in biology. Only that there we
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have more reason to hope that it can be overcome by simulations that are
more closely knit to the measurable quantities of the empirical processes.
What then are we left with? Since Axelrods simulation as applied to the
“live and let live” system of the first world war violates the both the adequacy
requirement and the stability requirement (the latter is the case even, if we
treat it as a merely partial explanation), it cannot claim to be explanatory.
At best it delivers us an alternative metaphorical description for the strate-
gical situation the soldiers found themselves in in terms of game theoretical
concepts. Offering no more than that it has hardly anything to add to the
detailed explanations Ashworth offers within his historical narrative.
The example shows how difficult it is to make any good use of Axelrod
style simulations in the social sciences. Partly this has to do with typical
difficulties that all formal approaches face in the social sciences outside eco-
nomics. There are two main reaons for the limited success of formal methods
in social sciences. First of all, social processes do often result from an intri-
cate set of intervoven causes (see the example above), for only some of which
we have a formal description ready at hand. But if we cannot single out the
causes that can be described formally then any accuracy that is gained by
the formal description inevitably gets lost when we reintegrate the formally
described causes with the other causes in a comprehensive explanation. The
second reason is that measurement is difficult in social sciences and that only
few quantities can be measured with accuracy. (In the above example, how
would you measure the empathy the soldiers felt for the likes of them on the
other side of the fontline?) It is not only true for computer simulations that
our formal modelling is just as good as our measurement capabilities. Partly,
however, the reason why Axelrod style simulations fare so badly is due to the
fact that it is just a very incautious type of modelling.
4.1.4 Do Axelrod-style simulations do any better in biology?
The sceptical conclusion about Axelrod-style simulations the last section
closes with becomes even more inevitable when we look at examples from
biology, a field were the obtacles agains formal modelling are much smaller
than in social sciences. Being not a biologist myself, it would of course be
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difficult for me to estimate the usefulness of Axelrod style simulations for
the explanation of cooperative behaviour in biology. Luckily, there exists a
comprehensive survey by the biologist Lee Allen Dugatkin on “Cooperation
among Animals” (Dugatkin, ???) that pays some particular attention to the
manyfold of game theoretical computer simulations that have come up in the
aftermath of Axelrod’s “Evolution of Cooperation”. In the beginning of his
book Dugatkin list a whole number game theoretical computer simulations
and their results, which – being the results of computer simulations alone
– are purely theoretical of course. The major part of his book consists of
a survey of the empirical reasearch on the various instances of cooperative
behaviour that can be found in the animal kingdom. Interestingly, there
exists not a single instance of cooperative behaviour in the animal kingdom
to which any (!) of these computer simulations could be applied in a strict
sense.
This is not to say that biologists did not try to do so. The attempt
has been made, for example, to apply Axelrod’s and Hamilton’s theory of
the evolution of cooperation to the behaviour of predator inspection that is
found among various types of shoal fishes. In an early paper by Manfred
Milinski on the topic (Milinski, 1987), Milinski tries to find out – with the
help of an inventive experimental setup – whether pairs of inspecting fishes
play “Tit for Tat” like Axelrod and Hamilton postulated it for the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. In order to do so Milinski also asesses (or rather esti-
mates) the payoff parameters of Axelrod’s model as applied to this particular
case. Like Axelrod in the case of the “live and let live” system in the trench
war of th First World War, he confines himself to an assessment of the or-
dinal relations between the payoff parameters. But unfortuantely Axelrod’s
model is sensitive to the cardinal values of the payoff parameters. In later
studies on the topic of predator inspection the attempt to explain this type
of behaviour with Axelrod’s theory of the “evolution of cooperation” seems
to have been completely dropped. In a paper that appeared ten years later
(Milinski und Parker, 1997) than the first study, Milinski and Parker, even
leave the question open, whether pairwise predator inspection is an instance
of cooperative behaviour at all, although this still appears likely. A major
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methodological problem is that – despite some very ingenious experiments
– it is very difficult to measure or to estimate reliably both the risk a fish
runs when inspecting a predator and the fitness relevant payoff a fish receives
from inspecting. (The former has to some degree been achieved by Milinski
and Parker, but the latter remains an open riddle).
As Dugatkin summarizes the situation in the concluding chapter of his
book, there exists, with one exception, no case of cooperative animal be-
haviour where the payoff parameters required as input for the game theo-
retical computer models could be measured. Therefore it is no surprise that
none of the many Axelrod style simulations of the evolution of cooperation
could be applied strictly to any of the empirical instances of cooperation in
biology. It is therefore very doubtful whether this type of simulations (which
remains remote from concrete empirical research and rest purely on “plausi-
ble”assumptions) is of any use for biologists at all. Another leading exponent
of the game theoretical approach in biology puts it the following way: “Why
is there such a discrepancy between theory and facts? A look at the best
known examples of reciprocity shows that simple models of repeated games
do not properly reflect the natural circumstances under which evolution takes
place. Most repeated animal interactions do not even correspond to repeated
games.” (Hammerstein, 2003, p. 83) And after a long discussion of problems
that the study of cooperative behaviour of animals faces the same expert
concludes: “Most certainly, if we invested the same amount of energy in the
resolution of all problems raised in this discourse, as we do in publishing
of toy models with limited applicability, we would be further along in our
understanding of cooperation.” (Hammerstein, 2003, S. 92)
One might object that maybe some of the models can be further devel-
oped so that they actually fit some of the empirical examples of reciprocity.
This is of course true: It does not matter whether one starts constructing a
model with a certain empirical application case in mind and builds it around
measurable quantities (bottom up approach) or whether one starts with ar-
bitrary plausible assumptions and only later on tries to adjust the model to
specific empirical situations (top down approach). But the one way or the
other, our the models and the empirical processes they are related to should
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be brought together. For, just because we have a model that shows us that
for this or that reason cooperation evolves or breaks down, we cannot con-
clude when we find some empirical example where cooperation evolves or
breaks down that it did so by virtue of the very same causes for which it
did in the model. It could also have been the effect of quite different causes.
Unless there is a close fit between model and reality we will never know.
But instead of seeking to achieve a fit between model and reality, the
tradition of Axelrod-style modeling of the “evolution of cooperation” largely
proceeded a different course. Computer simulation followed after computer
simulation, each of them changeing the basic configuration in some way or
other or trying the addition of new and different parameters. But most
of these simulations never got to the ground of empirical testability. This
way, however, computer simulations only lead away from the real scientific
problems.
4.2 Can we simulate the “Social Contract”?
But it is not just because it leads us scientifically astray that too much
indulgence into pure model research is bad. The other problem is that it
may prevent us from seeing the most obvious, because our imagination is
limited by the narrow lense of our own models. This is what seems to have
happened to some of the modern game theoretical interpretations of social
contract philosophy.
Such a game theoretical interpretation has been put forward, among
others, by Brian Skyrms in two books, “Evolution of the Social Contract”
and “The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure” (Skyrms, 1996)
(Skyrms, 2004), in both of which he presents computer simulations to deal
with classical questions of social contract philosophy. The theory of the social
contract is rooted in the philsophy of the 17th and 18th century with Thomas
Hobbes’“Leviathan”being the most famous work dedicated to social contract
philosophy and Skyrms believes that we can raise the discussion to a higher
level by applying the modern tools of game theoretical computer simulations
to it. It is as a stag hunt game that Skyrms presents the central question of
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the social contract in the latter of the two works (though he acknowledges
that the prisoner’s dilemma usually is the more common candidate): “How
do we get from the hunt hare equilibrium to the stag hunt equilibrium? We
could approach the problem in two different ways. We could follow Hobbes
in asking the question in terms of rational self-interest. Or we could fol-
low Hume by asking the question in a dynamic setting. We can ask these
questions using modern tools - which are more than Hobbes and Hume had
available, but still less than we need for fully adequate answers.” (Skyrms,
2004, p. 10)
Skyrms is by no means alone with his belief in the superiority of the
“modern tools” when it comes to social contract philosophy. His belief is
shared by many analytic philosphers. Thus we read in a recent introduction
to philosphy: “It would be interesting and important if we could make more
precise the sort of argument Hobbes offered, so that we could say just why
it is that the advantages of civil society over the state of nature ought to
appeal to anyone.” Appiah (2003) The author goes then on to introduce the
prisoner’s as a “modern tool” which – as the reader is to believe – allows to
“make more precise the sort of argument Hobbes offered”.
Is it really possible to “make more precise the sort of argument Hobbes
offered” by translating the metaphoric langauge of 17th and 18th century
philosophers (e.g. Hobbe’s state of nature, Rousseau’s stag hunt metaphor)
into precise game theoretic models? In order to answer this question, let’s
first see what kind of problems the social contract theories of the 17th and
18th century philosophers deal with and then examine Skyrm’s treatment of
these problems. Social contract philosophy is traditionally concerned with
two different questions:
1. Normative social contract philosphy is concerned with justification of
political order and, furthermore, with the requirements a political order
must fullfill in order to be just.
2. Descriptive social contract philosophy tries to answer the question how
political order evolves out of anarchy and how just (or democratic)
order evolves from authoritarian oder.
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It is primarily the descriptive question of social contract philosophy that
Skyrm’s game theoretical discussion is addressed to. For that matter Skyrms
presents a number of simple game theoretical models, including his simulation
of the stag hunt game. His simulation of the stag hunt game is a territorial
simulation, where players on a two dimensional plane play a (one shot) stag
hunt game pairwise with their neighbours. They change their strategy (to
cooperate or not to cooperate) depending on to the most successful strategy
in their neighbourhood. Skyrms then examines the effects of the respective
sizes of the interaction and reproduction neighbourhood. He summarizes his
results as follows:
How much progress have we made in addressing the funda-
mental question of the social contract: “How can you get from
the noncooperative hare hunting equilibrium to the cooperative
stag hunt equilibrium?” The outlines of a general answer have
begun to emerge. Over time there is some low level of experi-
mentation with stag hunting. Eventually a small group of stag
hunters comes to interact largely or exclusiveley with each other.
This can come to pass through pure chance and the passage of
time in a situation of interaction with neighbors. ... The small
group of stag hunters prospers and can spread by reproduction
and imitation. The process is facilitated if reproduction or imi-
tation neighborhoods are larger than interaction neighborhoods.
(Skyrms, 2004, p. 123)
As far as the stag hunt game goes Brian Skyrms is surely right, but if this
model is to tell us anything about how political order evolves from anarchy,
Brian Skyrms completely misses the point. If Skyrms computer simulations
of the stag hunt game really was an adequate model for the evolution of the
social contract then we would have to conclude that political order could,
if only the neighbourhood structure were favorable enough, evolve from an-
archy even without the institution of a Leviathan, merely by the gradual
propagation of cooperation through neighborhoods. This is of course a most
delightful prospect, though, sadly, one for which there exists not a single
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precedence in history. Other than Skyrm’s simulations suggest and as the
authors of the 17th and 18th century well knew, there is no way to bring
about political order without a Leviathan of some kind. Apart from this
lapse, which obviously the “modern tools” could not prevent, there is another
omission that must appear striking to anyone who has ever wasted a thought
on what the requirements and conditions of political order are: Nowhere in
the various game theoretic models Skyrms presents in his two books is the
phenomenon of rulership (Herrschaft) and submission (Beherrscht werden)
reflected, even though this is probably the most basic phenomenon of politics
and a condition that surely any serious theory about the evolution of political
order must take account of.
Surprisingly, this blunder went largely unnoticed in the lively discussion
following the publication of Skyrm’s first book. Only Philipp Kitcher points
out that dominance hierarchies play an important part in evolution and that
the sort of symmetric games Skyrms looks at do not properly reflect these
(Kitcher, 1999). Kitcher’s remark leads in the right direction, but it does not
hit the point, because dominance hierachies as they exist among animals as
well as among humans are not the same as rulership, which is an exclusively
human phenomenon. The decisive difference is that a ruler can order a
subject to do something, while dominance merely means that the others
will give way to the dominant person (or animal), which is much less than
carrying out orders.
But what caused this rather grave oversight? How come that Skyrms
offers an answer to the fundamental question of the social contract that
is obviously wrong? What Skyrms and other analytical philsophers seem
to forget when they seek to make arguments from 17th and 18th century
philsophers more precise by reformulating them in game theoretical terms, is
that metaphors (like the state of nature metaphor or the stag hunt metaphor)
do not get any better if one makes them more precise only on the side of the
metaphorical image without paying due attention to the relation between the
metaphor and its object. If the relation between the formal model that is
to replace the metaphor and the object of the metaphor is not made more
precise (in terms of adequacy, stability and descriptive appropriateness) the
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epistemological strength of the model is not any greater than that of the
metaphor.4 Or, to put it briefly: A metaphor remains a metpahor even
if it employs a formal model as its object of comparison. For this reason
it is also a fairly irrelevant question whether the state of nature is better
described as a prisoner’s dilemma or as a stag hunt game or as some other
game. As the failure of Skyrms to provide a sound argument for either of
the questions of social contract philosophy shows, the miscarried attempt to
translate metaphoric descriptions into formal models may even disrupt the
whole argument.
In the case of the Axelrod-style simulations of the “evolution of the social
contract”discussed in the previous section it seemed that too much attention
was spend on the construction of models and too little attention on whether
the models are adequate. But when looking at Skyrms treatment of the social
contract one may easily get the impression that he has never thought about
the subject matter in question at all. At this point, however, it might be
asked if Skyrms really wanted to tell us anything about the social contract,
or if just wanted to show how some of the metaphors from the political
philosophy of elightment could be represented by game theoretical models
without any specific claim about their applicability in any (including the
original) context. But then, he explicitly relates his models to the social
contract. If this is to be taken serious then the severe misunderstandings
that result can only be due to the fact that he perceives his subject matter
exclusively through the narrow lense of his own models. To give a name to
the narrowing of perception or, rather, imagination as a result of the exclusive
occupation with the technical aspects of formal modelling, I propose to call
it “model think”. “Model think”occurs when we conceive reality only through
one specific brand of models and when we let other possibilities of conceiving
reality escape our attention just because they cannot properly be represented
with this brand of models.
4This is not to say that it is never useful to replace metaphors by models, for the
epistemological strength of a model can – if the subject matter in question permitts – be
increased, while that of a literal or poetical metaphor cannot.
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5 Conclusions
Quite a few lessons that can be learned from the previous examples of fail-
ures of computer models. Some of them are truisms, but as they are often
neglected they are important nontheless.
First of all, if our models are to be explanatory then the establishment of a
close fit between model and reality is at least as important as the construction
of the model itself. The biological examples such as Milinski’s and Parker’s
studies on predator inspection suggest that establishing this fit may even be
much harder and more time consuming than constucting the model itself.
Secondly, when there is no close fit between model and reality, then the
model has approximately the epistemological status of a metaphor. The re-
sults of such non explanatory simulations are hardly more than computer
generated metaphors. Therefore, one must be very careful when drawing
conclusions from them. At best one can regard these conclusions as mere hy-
potheses that still require an independent empirical confirmation. It should
be clear that explanations based on non explanatory computer simulations
amount to nothing more than model based story telling. Im am introducing
these terms, because I believe that we need some negative catch phrases to
characterise the misuses of formal models and, specifically, computer simula-
tions.
Finally, we should be aware of the fact that although the ease and power of
formal modelling has been greatly increased with the advent of the computer,
there still remain scientific areas where the advantages of formal modelling are
doubtful or where it is not possible at all. Computer simulations are just one
scientific tool among others, which is helpful in some situations but useless
in others. In my opinion the employment of the tool of computer simulations
should be seen as something that requires justification. Apart from the aim
to proof logical possibilities or to produce predictions it can be justified when
there exists a close fit to the sort of empirical situation the simulation models
or there is at least a realistic prospect of developing the simulation further
so that a close fit can be established. Where computer simulations cannot
not go beyond a merely metaphorical resemblance of empirical reality they
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are probably not worthwhile.
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